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Introduction

The United States Congress considered bankruptcy reform for eight years before George
W. Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BACPA") into
law on April 20,2005.' Congressional proponents alleged that rampant and abusive practices
required substantial reform measures to combat a staggering economic crisis that burdened every
honest citizen. In signing the legislation, the President explained, "too many people that can pay
walk away tiom their bills and the rest of society is forced to pay."2 Bankruptcy reform offered
the promise of "greater stability and fairness" in the American financial system3
Statistical data supported the argument for reform. During the decade preceding
enactment of the legislation, bankruptcy filings increased seventy percent.4 More than 1.6
million
..
. bankruptcy petitions were reportedly filed by consumer debtors in 2004,~and debts
.

a

C.;.

dischCged inhdu-uptcy were estimated to total tens of billions of dollars every
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..

illustrate the cost, Senator Hatch reported on the congressional floor that the amount was
sufficient to h n d thirteen million Pel1 grants or the entire United States Department of
Transportation for one year.7
As impIied by the bill's name, legislators attributed the escalating use of the bankruptcy
system to abuse. Proponents alleged that abusive practices were common due to an endemic
breach of personal responsibility among American

consumer^.^

As the social stigma of

' 151 Cong. Rec. H 1974, H 1997 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).

2

George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, WEEKLY
COMP.
PRES.DOC.,(Apr. 20, 2005).
Id*
151 Cong. Rec. E704 (daily ed. Apr. 12,2005) (statement of Dennis Moore).
Id.
See 15 1 Cong. Rec. E623 (daily ed. Apr. 12,2005) (statement of Rep. Tom DeLay).
7
144 Cong Rec. S I2 145 (daily ed. October 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch). The statement was made with
respect to debts discharged through bankruptcy in 1994.
8
151 Cong. Rec. H1974 (daily ed. Apr. 14,2005) (statement of Rep. Gingrey).

bankruptcy abated,"they

reasoned, society's values had deteriorated to the point were

opportunistic debtors used bankruptcy relief simply as a preferred method of financial
planning.'0 For example, after recording two albums that earned $170 rnilIion in sales, musical
artist Toni Braxton filed a bankruptcy petition, in part, because she wanted to be released from

'

her contract with the record producer.' On the Oprah Winfiey program, Braxton acknowledge
that despite contemplating the discharge of her debts, she purchased thousands of dollars in
Gucci flatware the day before filing her petition.'2 Other testimony indicated that technical
provisions of the code allowed debtors to legally retain substantial wealth at the expense of
discharged creditors. For example, the actor Burt Reynolds, a resident of the State of Florida,
legally shielded his 2.5 million dollar estate while his creditors wrote-off several million dollars

in
:- .

.

debt^.',^

Arguably, the bankruptcy system created a mechanism for debtors lacking personal

integrity to compare the burden of repayment todhe benefit of discharge, even when the debtor
arguably had the financial means to satisfy his debts.
Armed with abundant illustrations and staggering statistics, reform proponents argued

that debtors lacking in conscience and personal responsibility flourished in the bankruptcy
system at the expense of truly honest citizens who lost by living within their means. Discharged
debts were estimated to cost each family approximately five hundred fifty dollars each year'4 in
the form of a "hidden tax" that was passed on to consumers through higher prices and interest

9

H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt I, at 4 (2005) reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. No. 4,90.

'*151 Cong. Rec, E623 (daily ed. Apr. 12,2005) (statement of Rep. Tom DeLay).
1I

Bankruptcy Revision: Henring Before the S.Comm. OF, the Judiciary. 1 0 9 ~Congress (Peb 10,2005) (statement of
Professor Todd J. Zywicki, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
l 2 Id.
l 3 144 Cong. Rec. SI2145 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (alleging that a Virginia
multimillionaire discharged "massive" consumer debt while retaining a race horse valued at six hundred forty
thousand dollars); (See also statement of Sen. Kohl alleging that the actor, Burt Reynolds, a resident of the State of
Florida, legally shielded his 2.5 million dollar estate while his creditors wrote-off several million dollars)
14
Congressional Press Release, Word on: Bnnbrrptcy Reform, (April 22, 2005) (Senator Chuck Grassley).

rates.'' Effectively, reform proponents argued, a remedy originally designed to give an honest
but unfortunate debtor a sec~nd'chanci'~
had deteriorated into an economic game in which
bankrupt debtors spent freely and without obligation or consequence. l 7 Proponents consistently
promised that reform legislation would correct the problem by restoring personal responsibility
and integrity in the bankruptcy system.18

Additionally, legislators argued that bankruptcy attorneys were culpable for the abusive
practices of their clients. The charge arose from the claim that bankruptcy practitioners
conducted little or no investigation into the merits of a petition but "willy-nilly cart[ed] their
client[s] off to bankruptcy court and pocket[ed] a nice profit."19 Bankruptcy specialists were
while
criticized as "view[ing] bankruptcy as an opportunity to make big money for thernse~ves"~~
willingly assisting their clients' legalized theft.21Thus, in addition to identifying the need to
,

:. . :',

.

.

:'restore-pei.sonal responsibility-in.the.bankrupfcy systein;:proponents argued that integrity need&
to be restored in the bankruptcy bar.
Accordingly, a reform policy evolved in which the overall objective was to ferret out the
so-called deadbeat and fraudulent debtors and force those debtors to recognize their moral
obligation to satisfy their prior promise. In other words, reform mandated repayment under
certain circumstances by compelling more debtors to pay more of their debts before a legaI fresh
l5 Bankruptcy Revision: Hearing Before the S. Cornrn. on the Judiciary, 1 0 9 Congress
~
(Feb 10,2005) (statement of
Professor Todd J. Zywicki, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, "Like other business
expenses, when creditors are unable to collect debts because of bankruptcy, some of those losses are inevitably
passed on to responsible Americans who live up to their financial obligations. Every phone bill, electric bill,
mortgage, furniture purchase, medical bill, and car loan contains an implicit bankruptcy "tax" that the rest of us pay
to subsidize those who do not pay their bills."
l6 Robert J. Landry, 111, The Policy and Forces Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic Battle Over
Problem Definition, 33 U . MEM.
L. REV. 509 (Spring 2003).
17
Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other Tales of Economics, Law, and Morality, 82 WASH.U .
L.Q. 1485, 1486 (Winter 2004).
IB
144 Cong. Rec. S 12145 (daily ed. October 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
19
10 04 Cong. Rec. S 10649 (daily ed. Sept. 2 1, 1998) (statement of Senator Grassley).
*O Id.
'katherine Vance, Corinne Cooper, Nine Traps and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the N m Bankruptcy Law,
79 AM.BANKR.
L.J. 283 (2005).

. .

,

start could be awarded. To accomplish this, discretionary provisions of the former law, (which
allowed a debtor to select the form of bankruptcy with the greatest advantage to the debtor), 22
were replaced with systemic mechanisms to determine whether a debtor has the "means" to pay
his debts.23Under the new law, a debtor deemed with the means to pay must file a Chapter 13
petition, which requires debt repayment over a period of three to five years. A second tier of the
reform policy made bankruptcy practitioners liable and accountable for the statements and
representations of their clients.24
Notwithstanding the clear policy to compel. payment and to make bankruptcy a difficult
option of last resort, BACPA was also promoted as consumer protection legislation.25While
conceding that not all filings constitute abuse, legislators asserted that many debtors sought
bankruptcy relief as a result of the debtor's financial illiteracy. Senator Hatch reasoned, "except
for-those,withevil motivations and a willingness to take;advantage,ofthe system, no one likes to
be in debt."26 Proponents also claimed that innocent and uninformed debtors were virtually
forced into the system by self-serving attorneys who ignored the needs of, or consequences to,
their debtor clients.27 They argued that bankruptcy practitioners preyed upon "unsophisticated
consumers who

... [did not] need bankruptcy

Thus, provisions were drafted in the bankruptcy code to ostensibly protect consumers.
Legislators argued that credit card disclosures and financial management programs could help

Under the former law, the debtor had the option to file under Chapter 7, in which the debtor surrendered all nonexempt assets in exchange for a discharge of eligible debts, or Chapter 13, in whch the debtor was permitted to
retain certain assets if the debtor completed a court-approved repayment plan. Under the former law, the debtor
could not be forced into Chapter 13, which was entirely voluntary.
23 See 11 U.S.C.S. !j 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
24
104 Cong. Rec. S 10649 (daily ed. Sept. 2 1, 1998) (statement of Senator Grassley).
H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt 1, at 2 (2005) reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. No 4,89.
26
151 Cong. Rec S1726, S1786 (Statement of Sen. Hatch).
l7 104 Cong. Rec. S10649 (daily ed. Sept. 2 1, 1998) (statement of Senator Grassley).
22

''

28

Id.

debtors avoid the "spiral that often leads to bankruptcy.29 BACPA also seeks to financially
educate debtors as to their options, in or outside of bankruptcy, so the debtor is able to address
the problems underlying their financial crisis.30Perhaps most notably, the bill includes a
"debtor's bill of rights" that is intended to protect debtors from "shady legal advisers who take
their fees and run."31

In sum, BACPA supporters promised that the massive reform measures were designed to
curb abusive practices while protecting innocent consumers.32 However, despite apparently
decent and compassionate intentions, some consumer protection measures may have the
unintended result of penalizing the truly honest debtor. This article discusses how certain
mechanisms, designed tozprotectconsumers, impose unintended barriers to critical relief. The
article also discusses how reform measures, intended to curb abusive practices, impose hardships
: .-.

on debtors fie.eding.thesystem most. 'The specific cclde~provision~
are identified and;eipl.ained;:.(.
and the intended goals, as expressed in the legislative history, are analyzed and compared to the
practical or actual result. The author also offers ameliorative proposals to ensure that the
"consumer protection" provisions of the act realize the promise that BACPA will "protect those
who legitimately need help."33
The Credit Counseline Prerequisite

A central theme of the 1egisIation involved educating debtors about their responsibility to
pay their debts and manage their finances. Except in the case of abusive or opportunistic filings,
legislators expressed relative compassion for truly unfortunate debtors. However, proponents

Congressional Press Release, Word on: Bankruptcy Reform, (April 22,2005) (Sen. Chuck Grassley).
151 Cong. Rec. E623 (daily ed. Apr. 12,2005) (statement of Rep. Tom DeLay).
31
151 Cong. Rec. S1726, S1786 (statement from Sen. Hatch).
32 George W. Bush, supra,
33 Id.
29

30

alleged that many able debtors filed bankruptcy petitions either because they were financially
dysfunctional or merely misinformed. The Bankruptcy Reform Commission, which was
established to study bankruptcy's causes among other matters, reported that evidence suggested
that the decision whether or not to seek bankruptcy relief was often not made in a rational way.34
Thousands of debtors reportedly found themselves in bankruptcy without informed knowledge or
consent, and bankruptcy lawyers were blamed for the result .35 In a Congressional speech,
Senator Grassley argued that bankruptcy lawyers virtually forced debtors into the system,
because, rather than consider the clients best interests, the attorney's efforts were aimed toward
creating "bankruptcy mills" that processed petitions in high volumes."36 To curb these practices,
legislators proposed thrd-party counseling to ensure that the so-called honest debtor was fully
informed of his options for repayment, with or without bankruptcy, as well as the consequences

of the respective choices;,.- ..
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Under the new law, absent exigent circumstances, a debtor is not eligible for bankruptcy
relief until he has completed a credit counseling class.37 The counseling requirement is
described as a tool that allows a consumer to make an informed choice as to whether or not to
proceed to bankruptcy after considering all of the alternatives and consequences.38One
proponent said it is analogous to the informed consent that a patient gives before agreeing to a
medical operation." The debtor may meet the requirement by consulting with an approved
agency on the internet or over the phone.40 By requiring counseling as a prerequisite to filing,
the new law presumably eliminates the occasion for accidental bankruptcy filing and protects the
34

H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt I, 93rdCong. (1972).
142 Cong. Rec. E 1738 (Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bono).
36 104 Cong. Rec. S10649 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
37 1 I U.S.C.S. 8 109(h)(l).
38 15 1 Cong. Rec. H 1974, 1975 (daily ed. Apr. 14,2005) (statement of Rep. Gingrey).
39 Id.
40 George H.Singer, Michael P. Warren, A New Playing Field: Changes in the Rules of Bankruptcy, BENCH
AND
BAROF M ~ E S O(MayIJune
TA
2005).
35

debtor from " b a h p t c y mills" that maximize their own profit without conducting an analysis of
the debtor's various options.41However, the pre-petition requirement is detrimental to
bankruptcy debtors for three reasons: First, like some bankruptcy attorneys, credit counselors
may be self-sewing; second, the effort to determine speculative long-term benefits effectively
delays the immediate relief provided by the automatic stay and may ultimately impair the
debtor's ability to repay his debts; and third, the language and interpretation of the exception for
exigent circumstances penalizes the debtor making every effort to avoid the need for bankruptcy.
1. Credit Counselors
Unquestionably, BACAP advocates strived to reduce the number of bankruptcy petitions
filed and compel debtors to be financially responsible for their debts.42 Proponents argued that
the counseling requirement has the benefit of educating:debtors.about money management and a
mora1:obligation-topay just debts.4?..They.seemed.t6..reaSm:that.if evidence indicated that,'some
debtors found themselves accidentally in bankruptcy, perhaps others could discover that with
proper financial management their debts could be resolved without the necessity for bankruptcy.
Although the credit counseling requirement supports the BACPA policy to compel
repayment, it may fail to protect the most vulnerable consumers from self-serving counselors.
Credit counseling services were created by creditor banks and credit card companies in an effort
Counseling
to stem the growing volume of personal bankruptcies during the rnid-1960's.~~
agencies assist consumers who cannot afford to make all of their scheduled payments by
enroIling the debtor in "debt management plans," which in some circumstances allow the debtor

Bankruptcy Revision: Hearing Before the S. Comrn. on the Judiciary, 109' Congress (Feb 10,2005) (statement of
Professor Todd J. Zywicki, Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
42 See Grassley, Hatch supra.
43 144 Cong. Rec. S 12145 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
44
Profleering in an non-profit indusny: Report: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs. April 13, 2005 S. Rpt. 55.
4'

to consolidate debts, lower interest rates and reduce the attendant monthly payments. Although
credit counseling efforts may seem altruistic, Congressional reports indicate counselors are often
motivated to compel debt-ridden consumers to sign onto debt management plans to meet sales or
performance goals of the agency." By imposing the burden pre-filing, the debtor is vulnerable
to practices calculated to advance performance objectives rather than determine the debtor's
most appropriate option. Effectively, the debtor is forced to consult with a third-party whose
motives may be inconsistent with the debtor's best interests.
Proponents would counter that the consumer is protected fiom unscrupulous practices,
because the approved agencies must be not-for-profit entities, but the claim is without merit. A
corporation qualifies as not-for-profit under the Internal Revenue Code if it is organized and
operated for certain purposes, such as education or charity.46 The organization may earn
revenue, but no part of the corporations eamings:"may inure to the benefit of any individual or
any private shareholder in the corporation.'d7 Although approved counseling agencies are
legally organized as not-for-profit corporations, much of the credit counseling industry is alleged
to be "a network of not-for-profit companies Iinked to for-profit conglomerates.'*~hereis no
mechanism within the code to ensure that only qualified credit counseling agencies are
approved.'9 Hence, there are no mechanisms to ensure that debtor interests trump credit
counseling objectives. Apparently, no effective mechanisms exist to protect debtors, because
not-for-profit organizations are even reportedly exempt from industry regulations enabled by the

Id,
26 U.S.C. $ 501(c)(3).
47 ld.
48
15 1 Cong. Rec.H1974,H1984. (Apr. 14,2005)(statement of Rep.Lee)
49 Tony Anderson, Bankruptcy Reform Act to have significant effect on lawyers as well as debtors, WISCONSM
LAW
JOURNAL (August 10,2005)(LexisNexis Academic 2005).
45

46

Credit Repair Organizations Act of 1997.50
The concern is not speculative. The credit counseling industry is reportedly "plagued
with consumer complaints about excessive fees, pressure tactics, nonexistent counseling and
education, promised results that never materialize, ruined credit ratings [and] poor service."'l
Data indicate that under the current credit counseling 'system, some debtors emerge fiom
counseling in worse financial condition than they begans2 Consequently, rather than providing
objective financial analysis and counseling, the credit counselors are in the position of profiting

from the misfortune of their creditors.53 The ironic result is that legislation intended to protect
debtors from unscrupulous lawyers instead places them before potentially dishonest counselors,
who, unlike attorneys, have no fiduciary duty to the debtor.

2. Delavs Automatic Stay ReIief
., ,.
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~S-~Pro~onlents~wil~
argue that iii addi~ohito.,-mfoming~the:de~t6r~of~his~~repayment~optio~s,~
.'

the new'law gives the debtor leverage to negotiate debt reduction and a reasonable payment plan.
This is because the bankruptcy court may penalize a creditor who refuses to negotiate a good
faith settlement prior to the debtor's bankruptcy.54 Thus, at least in theory, credit counseling
protects the debtor, because it improves the debtor's financial literacy, may reduce the debtor's
financial burden, and it eliminates the need to file a bankruptcy petition.55 Arguably, such a
result preserves the debtor's financia1 integrity by avoiding the bankruptcy blemish.
However, this logic assumes that every debtor in need of bankruptcy relief has not ever
attempted to reconcile his financial troubles or negotiate a solution with his creditors.
Profiteering in an non-profl industry: Reporr: Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs. April 13,2005 S. Rpt. 55.
51
15 1 Cong. Rec H 1974, HI984 (Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Matsui).
52 Id.
s3 Id.
54
144 Cong. Rec. S 12145 (daily ed. October 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Batch).
55
Bankruptcy Revision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judicialy, 1 0 9 Congress
~
(Feb 10,2005) (statement of
Mr. P. Michael Steward Menzies, Sr. President & CEO East Bank and Trust Company).
50

Unfortunately, many debtors facing the prospect of bankruptcy have already exhausted their
negotiation alternatives and any delay in filing could result in permanent loss. Legal action
toward the collection of a defaulted obligation is ofien regarded as the triggering cause that leads
to bankruptcy.56 Notwithstanding the sensational stories of individual debtor abuse, a study
conducted for legislative hearings indicated that during the two years prior to bankruptcy, "45%
of the debtors studied had to skip a needed doctor visit, over 25% experienced termination of
their utilities by the utility company, and 20% went without food.57 Simply expressed, most
debtors file for bankruptcy relief because they have no choice, "not because they have too many
Rolex watches or ~ a r n e b o ~ s . " ~ ~
For those debtors, the credit counseling requirement may create a permanent barrier to
needed relief. Section 362 provides.that a filed petition operates as a stay, "applicable to the
commencement or~continuation;including.theissuance or employment of process of a judicial . .
administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor."59 Effectively, upon filing of a
petition, the stay temporarily prevents all collection efforts, including execution, levy,
foreclosure or garnishment. Although the stay stops collection, the purpose of the provision is to
preserve the asset, either for the debtor or for the bankruptcy estate. The rights of the secured
creditor continue, subject to relevant bankmptcy law. In other words, the automatic stay does
not relieve the debtor of the responsibility to pay a secured debt, it merely suspends collection
efforts until the issues are equitably resolved. Since credit counseling is now a prerequisite to
filing,60the relief afforded by the code is ordinarily delayed until the debtor successfully

56

H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part I; 93'* Cong., IS' Sess. Report of the Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws of the United

States (Sept. 6 ,

1973).

'' 151 Con.Rec. H 1974,H1984 (daily ed. Apr. 14,2005) (letter introduced by Rep. MaIoney).
BankrUptcy Revision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 109' Congress (Feb 10,2005) (statement of
Professor Elizabeth Warren and Leo Gottlieb, Professors of Law, Harvard Law School).
59 l 1 U.S.C.S 5 362 (a).
60 George H. Singer, Michael P. Warren, supra
58
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completes the course then files his petition. If the debtor is coerced to make a final effort to
reconcile and pay all existing debts, the debtor remains susceptible to collection efforts by
individual creditors.
Conceivably, while a debtor is learning of his rights to negotiate repayment with his
creditor, his car could be removed itom his driveway by that very creditor executing its lien. If
the creditor sells the vehicle before the debtor files his petition for bankruptcy, the asset is
permanently lost. Under this scenario, the provisions compelling a creditor to negotiate are
irrelevant, because that creditor's claim would not be subject to a subsequent bankruptcy filing,
and the bankruptcy court would have no power or authority to penalize the creditor.
Consequently, the counseling prerequisite could cause a financially stressed debtor to loose not
only an asset that would be legitimately protected by the code, but also an asset that may be
debts:, ,,Bybamng every debtor-from even
necessary to obtain empIoyment~revenue1o0r~epa~his
filing a petition until he is educated on how to create a personal budget or plan to repay the
existing debt without the need for bankruptcy, the new law could actually impair the debtor's
ability to repay his debts.

3. Exigent Circumstances
A similar situation arises when the debtor is unable to schedule counseling before a
pending foreclosure sale. Under those circumstances, the debtor may obtain a waiver of the prepetition counseling requirement by leave of the court. To obtain such leave, the debtor must file
with his petition a certification that: a) describes exigent circumstances that merit a waiver of the
pre-petition requirements; b) states that the debtor requested credit counseling services but was
unable to obtain the services during the five day period beginning on the date on which the

debtor first made the request; and c) is satisfactory to the court." If the waiver is granted, the
debtor is given an extension of time in which to obtain counseling.62 The effect of a waiver is to
declare the debtor "eligible to be a bankruptcy debtor,"63 which commences the automatic stay
protection, subject to the debtor's subsequent compliance with the credit counseling
requirement.64
The exception for exigent circumstances is almost certainly intended to temporarily
relieve the debtor of the filing prerequisite when circumstances warrant.

In one recent case, the

debtor sought a waiver, because she was unaware of the counseling requirement until she sought
assistance from a bankruptcy attorney the day before the scheduled foreclosure sale of her

home.65 When she attempted online and telephone counseling, she was informed that she would
need to make an appointment on a date.that occurred after the scheduled sale.66 In another

similar case, a debtor facing:forecloswe8the:following day contacted a credit counseling agency,.
and, pursuant to the counselor's instruction, downloaded, completed and submitted the forms to
the counseling agency on the very same day.67 When she contacted the agency the following day
they informed her that the counseling could not be completed for a "couple of days."68 In each
of these cases, the court found that the debtor met the first requirement by describing exigent
circumstances that merit a waiver of the pre-petition requirements.
However, a finding of exigent circumstances is not sufficient to obtain a waiver, because
the debtor must also prove that he has attempted, but has been unable to obtain, counseling, for a

11 U.S.C.S. $ 109(h)(3).
Id.
63
See I n re Dipinto, 336 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Penn.2006).
62

65

Id.
I n re Wallert, 332 B.R.884 (Bankr.D. Minn. 2005).

66 Id.
67

~n Re Talib, 335 B.R. 41 7,422 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.2005).

Id.

.-. - -

. . .'
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period of five days.69 Hence, a debtor facing the prospect of foreclosure must anticipate and plan
counseling at least six days before the scheduled foreclosure sale.70 If the debtor does not
anticipate the requirement, and the debtor is unable to receive counseling before the scheduled
saIe, the debtor will be disqualified from filing the bankruptcy petition.7' Accordingly, in the
cases described above, both courts denied the waiver requests, because neither debtor was denied
counseling for five days. Since the debtors could not meet the statutory requirement to complete
counseling or obtain a waiver, the debtors were ineligible for bankruptcy relief. As a result, the
bankruptcy cases were dismissed, and the debtors' assets were presumably lost.
~
is not the only harm to the debtor. Although the debtor
Unfortunately, the loss of a i asset

may file a second petition after meeting the filing requirements and paying a second filing fee,
the automatic relief afforded by right is reduced when~k.subsequentpetition is filed. Thus, if a
,.

.

.;.-..

. :

deb;t'oi.fileia- second petition;the.aut~rnatic~:stay,~w~hich~iiever
w'en~intoaffect:&Bet:filing~the

-

first petition), is now limited to a period of thirty days,72and the debtor receives no automatic
reliefwhen three or more petitions are filed within a one year period.73 Though the statute
provides for an extension of the stay if the debtor can establish that the subsequent petition was

filed in good faith, a presumption of bad faith arises when multiple petitions are filed within one
year.74
According to legislative history, these amendments were made to combat the abusive
practices of debtors that repeatedly filed bankruptcy petitions simply to stay collection efforts of
legitimate credito~-s.75
These amendments were clearly aimed at discouraging abusive practices

" 1xl U.S.C.S. g 109(h)(3)(A)(ii).
'* In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884.
Id.
'* 11 U.S.C.S. 0 362(c)(3).
71

73
74
75

Id.
~ dat. 362(c)(3)(C).
104 Cong. Rec. S 10649 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1998) (statement o f Sen. Grassley).

.

by gradually extinguishing relief when manipulative practices warrant. Because the code does
not distinguish a case that is dismissed when a waiver is denied, the provisions have the effect of
foreclosing the original stay, even when the debtor did not receive even one day of relief as a
result of the first petition. As one legislator commented, "this bill takes the phrase, 'kick them
when they are down7to a whole new
Although it would seem that exigent circumstances would inherently prevent the
opportunity to plan and anticipate an unknown requirement, many recent decisions have
concluded that the result is reasonable. In one case, the court reasoned that the law should not
protect a debtor simply because he has declined to act despite notice of the creditor's action.77 h

a second case, the court explained, "the statute does nothing more than mandate debtors to
recognize.and start dealing with their straits of insolvency squarely, at least a week before they.
loss."78 While it is reasonable for the Cdllrt to
will bloom out:toan .achal;.pemanent.tConomic

.,

decline to create a parachute for irresponsible debtors, the arguments ignore the fact that debtors

may have many legitimate reasons for delaying a bankruptcy filing. For example, the debtor
may have a reasonable expectation of refinancing the debt or selling the asset to satisfy the
obligation. Under these circumstances, the debtor's conscientious efforts to resolve the debt,
without the need for bankruptcy, are penalized, because the debtor failed to consider bankruptcy
in time to identify and comply with the statutory requirements. Consequently, the legislation
effectively punishes the ignorant debtor attempting to repay his obligations whle granting fill
protection to a debtor who lacks personal responsibility but is plentiful in bankruptcy knowledge.

15 1 Cong. Rec. H.1974, H 1981 (Apr. 14,2005) (statement of Rep. Lee).
In Re Talib, 335 B.R. 417.
78
In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884.
76
77

-.

.

Attorney Certification and Liability

The attorney certification and liability provisions also impose barriers to debtor relief
Although the provjsions were aimed at curbing practices of bankruptcy practitioners, the
legislation'simpact eventually trickles to the debtor. This is because the reform measures create
attorney obligations that are likely to be passed on to the debtor through increased costs and
potential filing delays.

1. Reform Measures
The BACPA imposes investigative requirements upon attorneys and makes attorneys
liable for the debtor's statements and representations.79The attorney must certifi that she has
investigated the circumstances giving rise to the debtor's need for relief, has determined that the
pleading is well grounded'in fact, ,hasinquired.as to the .correctnessof the information, and has
the,infomi.atiori: -... 7
no knowledge that~the~tinfomati.~n-i~*.&~~~f'~D~-~nder~certai~~~ci~cumstances,~if
in the petition is subsequently proven-incorrect', the court may order the debtor's attorney to
reimburse the trustee for all reasonable costs in prosecuting a motion, including trustee's
attorney's fees." The court also has the discretion to assess civil penalties against the attorney.82

In addition to being liable to the court, the debtor's attorney may be liable to the debtor if
the petition is converted or dismissed.83 Although a penalty cannot be assessed absent a frnding
of intentional or negligent failure by the attorney to file a required document,84the threshold for
dismissal or conversion is low. For example, section 521 provides that the case is automatically
dismissed on the forty-sixth day after the petition is filed if all required information was not filed

1 1 U.S.C.S.$ 707(D).
Id. at $ 707 (C).
Id. at $707 (4)(A)
Id. at 3 707 (4)(B).
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within the first forty-five days, or if the debtor fails to attend a specific hearing.*' Similarly,
section 707 provides that a petition may be converted if the court determines that the petition is
abusive.86 A petition for relief is presumed to be abusive if monthly income exceeds monthly
expenses8' In sum, a lawyer who files a petition on behalf of a debtor could be, under certain
circumstmces, liable to the court for the costs of the case, to the debtor for damages, and to both
the court and debtor for civil penalties.

2. Congressional Intent
Taken in whole, legislative history indicates that the certification and liability provisions
were also intended to compel debt payment by effectively charging the attorneys with the
responsibility of keeping debtors honest. Proponents alleged that debtor abuse resulted, in part,
from the failure, by attorneys, to investigate the reliability of client statements. Senator Grassley
a1leged that practitioners conducted little investigation into the merits of a petition and,
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manipulated the system by "steer[ingJ hgh income people who can repay their debt into chapter
7.~88Moreover, minority members of the National Bankruptcy Commission claimed that
lawyers willingly assisted their clients' legalized theft.89Consequently, although the former
system had no mechanism to control access to Chapter 7, lawyers were targeted as villains who
advised their clients on "gaming" the system.90 Although the Iaw was amended to restrict access
to Chapter 7, the certification provisions were presumably implemented to ensure the honesty
and accuracy of debtor's statements by effectively making attomeys gatekeepers to the
bankruptcy system.

Id. at $ 52 1 (i)(l).
1 1 U.S.C.S. § 707.
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104 Cong,Rec. S10649 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1998) (statement o f Sen. Grassley).
89 Catherine Vance, Corinne Cooper, supra.
90
Sen. Grassley, supra.
85
86

,

.,

.
.

,

,

.

,,

:.'I

Further, the punitive measures seem to be intended to ensure the honesty of the preparing
attorney. Although the legislative history indicates that attorneys assisted their clients in
utilizing favorable provisions of the law, it does not suggest that attorneys were implicated for
assisting clients prepare fraudulent petitions. Recall however, that attorneys were strongly
criticized for dishonesty in dealings with their clients as many debtors reportedly did not intend
to enter bankruptcy. Reform proponents apparently combined that fact with evidence showing
numerous Chapter 7 filings. In other words, proponents inferred that but-for attorneys, debtors
who could pay would pay. Although that reasoning is incorrect, (because the former system
afforded a debtor the discretion to choose Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 regardless of his or her ability
to pay), proponents successfully argued that the regulation of attorney practice was essential to
refom. Because attorneys were so negatively'characterizedfor thejr role in the former system,
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Therefore, by requiring an attorney to certify the client's statements, reform measures
arguably ensure that statements in attorney-prepared petitions are reliable. Because repayment is
compelled under certain circumstances, the provision may have the secondary benefit of
ensuring that only honest and deserving debtors may file in chapter 7. Thus, the underlying
policy to compel payment is achieved, because the attorney prevents improper Chapter 7 filings
by investigating and certifying the debtor's statements. Since the attorney may be liable if a
chapter 7 petition is converted to chapter 13, the attorney is bound to verify the accuracy of the
statements or face substantial and intended consequence. "Why shouldn't the lawyer pay"
Senator Grassley reasoned, "if the lawyer was not substantially justified in filing?"9'

3. Impact on Bankrupt Debtors
Numerous scholars have suggested that the attorney certification and liability provisions
91

104 Cong. Rec. S10649 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley).

are likely to increase debtor costs. To protect themselves fiom the additional risk and liability,
practicing attorneys are predicted to increase their retainer fees and require documents or expert
opinions to support the valuations suggested by their clients.92 The Congressional Budget Office
estimated that the costs of compIying with reform provisions are likely to increase attorney costs
by one hundred fifty to five hundred dollars per

This is because attorneys are likely to

act conservatively by investing more time or, in some cases, hire accountants or other experts to
verify the information provided.94 One analyst suggested, effectively, financially struggling
debtors will pay more to their lawyers for gathering documents and certifying worthless a~sets.'~
As a result, those who are least likely to be able to pay their bills will be the least likely to afford

a bankruptcy attorney.
Regrettably, the cost of access to the bankruptcy system was previously recognized as,a
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banier to relief:g6The~additionalexpense necessary to confirm a debtor's dire financial;
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condition is almost certain to exclude even greater numbers of deserving debtors. Additionally,
ordinary market conditions may increase costs as many attorneys are predicted to eliminate
Chapter 7 cases From their practices altogether.97 Sadly, increased responsibilities and the
increased possibility for attorney sanctions, fines, and penalties are also predicted to result in
fewer volunteer efforts offered in pro bono representation
Additionally, attorneys may be compelled to delay the filing of a petition until the
attorney is reasonably certain he can comply with the filing requirements. Because the attorney
92
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is required to perform a reasonable investigation, the delay might span a substantial period of
time that is necessary to obtain third-party assessments and certifications. Thus, a consumer
seeking bankruptcy protection will not have the immediate relief provided by the automatic stay,
unless the debtor has the forethought, prior to his first appointment, to obtain asset valuations
and documents in support of his financial disclosures. Consequently, reform measures that were
calculated to "clamp down on badmptcy mills that make their mohey by advising abusers on
how to game the system"99 merely inhibit or delay legitimate debtors fiorn obtaining necessary
relief'. The relief afforded by the code is unavoidably delayed until the debtor can not only prove
that he is indeed in need of relief, but can also provide evidence in support his claim and the
representations of his assets' values.
. -In sigging the act into law; George W;-Bush proclaimed, "the act of Congress I sign today
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liability provisions create barriers for financially strapped consumers that legitimately need help.

As a result, these provisions of the BACPA make debtors extremely vulnerable to collecting
creditors, because they not only increase the debtor's costs but potentially delay relief designed
to help debtors obtain a fresh start. Although the new law seems intended to make relief
difficult, these provisions have the potential to entirely exclude low income debtors fiom the
system. That result most certainly does not protect those who legitimately need help.

Debtor's "Bill of Rights"
Throughout the years legislators debated bankruptcy reform, proponents consistently
described debtors as "deadbeats" who voluntarily incurred substantial debt without the intention
or ability to repay those debts. Legislators had little sympathy for these debtors, because they
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viewed them as merely lacking in personal responsibility. However, legislative history indicates
that not all debtors were in bankruptcy solely of their own volition. Lnstead, most debtors were
faced with bankruptcy after experiencing a job loss, divorce, or substantial medical expense.'''
Critics argued that reform measures were unduly harsh on these and other legitimately struggling
debtors. In an apparent response to the criticism, proponents countered that many of the
measures, commonly referred to as the "Debtor's Bill of Rights," were designed to protect
debtors.,, 102
1. Criticism of Attorney Practice

Although the bill of rights imposes some requirements upon credit card companies, most
provisions are largely directed toward bankruptcy attorney practice. As previously discussed,
legislative proponents alleged that reform measures were required to restore professionalism in
.

.

.the.bankruptcy bar.'03 Practice restrictions,were drafted in response to claims that debtors did not.
intend bankruptcy or even understand that they were consulting with an attorney.Io4 Apparently,
many lawyers advertised euphemistically as "debt reduction" or "federal repayment" agencies to
disguise the nature of their business or downplay the consequence of bankruptcy.'05 Senator
Grassley argued that the practices of some attorneys [were] "so deceptive and sleazy that ... the
Federal Trade Commission [issued] a consumer alert warning consumers of misleading ads
promising debt cons01idation."'~~Other consumers reported that attorneys failed to provide
significant services after the fees were paid and the petition was filed.'07
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Legislators also continued the theme alleging that lawyers counseled their clients to
manipulate the system and maximize the so-called "benefit" of bankruptcy. Proponents argued
that attorneys must be encouraging bee spending on credit during the period the debtor
contemplated bankruptcy, even though such practice was expressly in violation of the former
law. In response, these measures were ostensibly drafted to ensure the debtor had the
opportunity to understand the consequences of bankruptcy, as well as his acts in contemplating
bankruptcy, while giving the debtor the opportunity to make fully informed decisions when
employing counsel. The primary impact is on legal practice, because legislators argued that
reform measures were necessary to curb the practices of a bankruptcy bar that [was] seriously
out of control."'08
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person who provides any bankruptcy assistance in return for money or valuable consideration is
deemed a "debt relief agency" under the new law.Io9 Thus, an attorney who engages in any
practice involving bankruptcy is arguably a debt relief agency, unless the practitioner offers only

pro bono services. Further, all advertisement of bankruptcy services must include the statement:
"We are a debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy
code."'

lo

In light of the foregoing, the new law seems to ensure that all consumers seeking debt

relief assistance fiom an attorney are h l l y informed that the services offered are within the
context of bankruptcy.
The debt relief agencies are also required to provide specific disclosures to all counseled
debtors. The attorney must provide written notice describing the various bankruptcy chapters,
108
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the types of services available from credit counselors, and the penalties applicable for fraudulent

'

representations or statements.'' A second disclosure informs the debtor that his statements must
be complete and accurate and are subject to audit."'

Finally, the attomey must provide a

statement entitled, "Important Information About Bankruptcy Assistance Services From An
Attorney or Bankruptcy ~re~arer."'
l 3 The mandatory statement is apparently intended to inform
the debtor of the bankruptcy process so the debtor may discern whether professional services are
appropriate for his case. At least in theory, these disclosures educate the debtor about the types
of bankruptcy, the minimum requirements to enter bankruptcy, and the debtor's obligations and
also give the debtor the opportunity to decide whether professional services are necessary.
Finally, reform measures direct specific legal practices. For example, if the debtor retains
the attorney, the debtor and attorney must execute a written fee agreement describing the costs,
.fees and services.114Further, the code prohibits a debt relief agency, and thus the attorney; from
failing to perform any service offered.'I5 To enforce these provisions, the code gives the debtor
the exclusive right to void the agreement if the attorney fails to comply with certain

'l6

requirements.

3. Problems Created by the "Bill of Rights"

Clearly, there is a nexus between the described problems and the reform measures.
Debtors facing bankruptcy are vulnerable and some reform measures seem to protect them fiom
exploitation. However, certain disclosure requirements may be problematic or inadequate. This
is because the disclosure requirements were designed in the context of the former system.

"' Id. at 5 572 (a)(l).
' I 2 Id.

at 527(a)(2).
Id. at Q 527(c).
" 4 ld. at g 528(a)(l).
1 IS
ld. at 4 526(a).
Id. at. 3 526(c).
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Because the new system is substantially more complex and contains many hazards that did not
exist previously, reform measures intended to protect debtors may actually expose them to
substantial risk. That is, the disclosure fails to hlly inform the debtor of the processes'
complexities and may give the debtor an inaccurate impression about the need for legal
assistance.
Prior to executing a contract for services, the attorney is required to provide a disclosure
containing mandatory statements purported to give the debtor an opportunity to "help ...
evaluate how much service [is] need[ed].""'

If the debtor decides to seek bankruptcy relief, the

statement informs, "you can represent yourself, you can hire an attorney.. . or you can get help

... From a'bankruptcy petition preparer.. .
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The disclosure also describes the general

documents to .file and the basic bankruptcy requirements, including the payment of a filing fee ' .. :
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an6&tte21dance--riti~ieditiifid:~eeting?199~in~lly,
the~disclosureexplains.that a banknlptky ~GAS~.-."may involve litigation, but the debtor'is generally permitted to represent himself in bankruptcy
court.'20 Arguably, the complete disclosure gives debtors a reasonable opportunity to determine
whether legal counsel is a necessary or appropriate expense, which is certainly a legitimate
question for individuals with limited resources.
However, because the mandatory language only describes routine activity, the disclosure
supports an inference that counsel is generally unnecessary. Such inference may be inaccurate
for many debtors. The disclosure is notably deficient, because it fails to warn the debtor of the
potential hazards ahead. Under the previous system, the debtor was not at risk of procedural
peril unless the debtor was found to have substantially abused the system. Under the new
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system, a debtor faces an array of provisions, which if not satisfied, result in automatic dismissal
on the forty-sixth day after the petition is filed.12' 'The debtor also faces dismissal if, among other
things, he fails to provide a copy of a tax return to any requesting creditor'22or fails to timely file
a tax return or e ~ t e n s i o n . 'None
~ ~ of these procedural facts are included in the disclosure. Of
equal concern, the disclosure fails to inform the debtor that within forty-five days after filing the
petition, the debtor must both disclose his intent to reaffirm or redeem secured debt and perform
upon the it~tent.''~It also does not notifi the debtor that if, after declaring an intent to redeem or
reaffirm a debt, the debtor fails to do so by the forty-fifth day after filing, the automatic stay on
AS mentioned earlier
those debts are terminated,lZ5and the petition is automatically di~missecl.'~~
in this article, when a petition is dismissed and subsequently refilled, the debtor may forfeit
certain protections. Finally, the disclosure fails to inform debtors of the system's mechanisms

that are designedzto provide the financial protection that is necessary to 0btain.a fjresh start. .Eoi- .
example, in every jurisdiction, a debtor is awarded exemptions that exclude certain assets or a
certain amount of equity in particular assets.I2' Thus, a disclosure intended to protect debtors
from lackluster attorneys may have the inadvertent result of rendering the debtor unprepared to
plead his case.
While this argument may appear to be designed to protect attorney revenues, the core
issue is whether the debtor obtains adequate justice. Although the judicial system should always
afford litigants the option to proceed with or without legal assistance, the rules underlying the
system must be balanced, accurate and fair. As a general rule, the lack of legal representation

Id. at 5 521(i)(l).
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often results in the failure of debtors to resolve their legal issues, or the debtor's propensity to
abandon their legal rights.lZ8 Reportedly,pro se litigants are more likely to neglect time limits,
miss court deadlines and have problems understanding the procedural and substantive law
relating to their claims.'29 Therefore, the disclosure has the potential to lure a debtor into
thinking he is able to proceed pro se but neither arms nor informs the debtor of the adversarial
battle that awaits him.
Finally, the code restricts the attorney's client counseling. Section 526(a)(4) prohibits the
attorney from advising a debtor to incur additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy.'30 While
presumably intended to prevent a debtor from incumng debt he has no intention to pay, many
scholars have argued that a narrow interpretation prohibits the debtor's attorney from accepting
paymentlby charge on-the debtor's credit card.13' Those scholars suggest that a strict.readingof
;
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representation.13' Moreover, Professor Chemerinsky has suggested that the legislation

, .,

"effectively imposes restrictions that prevent the lawyer from providing accurate, legal and
desirable advice."'33 As an example, he argues, the provision restricts the attorney from advising
a debtor to seek a lower interest mortgage loan or consolidate unaffordable loans into a new loan

with manageable monthly

If this interpretation proves true, not only is the debtor's

access to legally desirable counseling seriously diminished, the value of the counseling may also
be diminished. Ironically, if the attorney cannot advise about financing options, the attorney
seems to be restricted to counseling only about options within bankruptcy. Clearly this result is
Id.
Id.
13* Id. at 5 526 (a)(4).
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unintended, because it is contrary to the underlying policy to encourage repayment and
resolution without bankruptcy. Admittedly, this argument requires a very narrow reading of the
law, but reform's aggressive assault on bankruptcy attorneys is likely to result in very
conservative practice. Within that context, this interpretation is certainly plausible.

Reform is Essential
Professor Nathalie Martin explains that bankruptcy systems are "value-laden social
systems that must be drafted with care to reflect the particular values of a culture."135The
American bankruptcy system juxtaposes two competing, and sometimes contrary, visions. On
the one hand, the American economic system relies on economic risk and entrepreneurialism to

propel its capitalistic

Early bankruptcy policies favored forgiveness when a debtor's

default resulted in bankruptcy, because continued spending was necessary to support the overall
.

.economic system.13' On the other hand, moral norms supporttheposition that voluntarily made
promises should be recognized with good faith efforts to satisfy those promises.'38 For that
culture, society should be sympathetic to the financial perils of the legitimately disadvantaged
debtor, but should not be responsible for the reckless abuses of irresponsible debtors.139
The fundamental tenet of American bankruptcy law historically supports the later view.
The bankruptcy system traditionally offers an honest but unfortunate debtor "a new opportunity
in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt."l4O Proponents consistently promised that those who legitimately needed help
would not be denied relief under the new law. "We're a nation of fhirness and compassion," the
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President stated when signing the legislation, "where those who need it most are afforded a fresh

tart."'^'
The BACPA is not compassionate or fair Jegislation, because its affects are most harshly
borne by the debtors most needing the system. The current system wrongly presumes that any
debtor contemplating bankruptcy is simply fiscally irresponsible or morally reprehensible, and it
erroneously assumes that every debtor entering bankruptcy has made virtually no other effort to
resolve the financial crisis. Consequently, the new law imposes harsh results upon the most
earnest debtors and may have counter-productive results. The legislation needs to be revamped
to consider the needs of the debtor who seeks emergency relief as a last resort after persistent
efforts to resolve their financial crisis.
.
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Even purportedly lund and compassionate provisions impose barriers to vital protection
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counseling prerequisite delays the automatic stay relief; the attorney certification and liability
provisions probably increase cost and delay filing; and the mandatory disclosure statement
inadequately prepares debtors for pro se litigation. Moreover, reform measures that were
designed to combat problems in the context of the former system apparently did not consider
how new provisions would be integrated. Consequently, the legislation contains duplicate
remedies and sometimes results in situations that are counter to the policy expressed by
legislative history.

To ameliorate this result, reform is essential. First, the credit counseling prerequisite
should be abolished, because it imposes the greatest burden upon the most desperate debtors.
Because the credit counseling industry was designed to assist creditors, the industry is not
impartial. Debtors may be vulnerable to the ulterior motives of the counselors, the individual
George W. Bush, supra.
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agencies, or the creditors funding the not-for-profit organizations. The debtor is also at risk of
permanently losing assets, the ability to earn income, and the legal protection afforded by the
code.

In addition to the harsh effects the requirement imposes upon debtors, the requirement
sometimes results in situations that are counter to reform policy or simply absurd. If the debtor
is unable to obtain the counseling, the requirement delays the automatic stay, which may result in
the loss of income or assets and limit the debtor's ability to repay his debts. Further, the exigent
circumstances exception harshly penalizes debtors who are making every effort to avoid the need
for bankruptcy. If the debtor truly makes every effort to avoid banlauptcy and is unable to
obtain counseling before filing, recent cases indicate that the debtor will be denied the exigent
circumstance exception. Ironically, the federal common law also indicates that the exception
rewards debtors with the foresight to "plan" their bankruptcy. This provision also hasthe ab'siud
result of penalizing debtors for "multiple filings" even when the debtor did not obtain even one
day of relief fiom the first petition.

The prerequisite is also redundant, because other reform provisions accomplish similar
purposes. Thus, eliminating the requirement will not open the door to abuse, because under the
new law, debtors who are determined to have the means to pay their debts are required to pay. In
fact, once the debtor enters bankruptcy, the debtor is required to direct one hundred percent of
disposable income to his debts. Effectively, the means test accomplishes the result intended by
the counseling, because it evaluates whether or not the debtor is able to pay and compels
payment when the mathematical standards so warrant. Similarly, other concerns addressed by
the counseling requirement are remedied by provisions of the new law. For example, the new
disclosure requirements virtually eliminate the occasion for an "accidental" bankruptcy filing,

and because a debtor is required to complete a finahcia1 management class before grant of
discharge, the educational purpose is hlfilled. Furthermore, eliminating the prerequisite
eradicates absurd results that penalize earnest debtors. Therefore, a reform proposal that
eliminates the counseling prerequisite restores some measure of fairness in the system without
jeopardizing the goals of reform.
Secondly, the attorney certification requirements must be amended to ensure that they do
not delay the debtor's relief. Under the current system, the attorney may be compelled to wait to
file a petition until she receives evidence supporting'the debtor's disclosures, because the
attorney is substantiaIly liable for the debtor's statements and representations. The law shouId be
amended to allow the attorney to certify the statements at any time before the creditor's meeting,
rather.whencthepetition is filed. This would provide automatic relief upon filing of the petition:

.

, . .:.,,.

,,.:, : T . ,, *. , I .
r

'

..

:;aii&.&lllbwThe-debtop
sufficient6ppoitunity provide curriint:statements,to his attorney:~:~It~.wwud~~
.:. .:

..'

also eliminate the absurd result under the current system that rewards debtors who have the

-

foresight to "plan" their bankruptcy while penalizing those who do not.
Finally, the mandatory disclosure statement must be substantial1y revised to properly
inform debtors of the role of the attorney, the debtor's obligations and the consequences of
failing to meet those obligations. Because current disclosure requirements were designed for the
fonner system, the information contained in the disclosure substantially misrepresents the
potential complexity of the process. Reform measures need to ensure that the disclosure
properly informs the debtor of his obligations in bankruptcy and the various means in which his
petition may be dismissed. Although tlus could be accomplished by reforming the law, a change
in the law is not essential, because there does not appear to be any provision which limits the
attorney disclosure to the mandatory statements. Accordingly, attorneys could conceivably
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provide a disclosure statement, which meets the requirements imposed by the law but also
provides adequate information. Perhaps the American Bar Association could draft a form to
serve this purpose. Thus, if the debtor elected to represent himself in bankruptcy, at least the
debtor would have an accurate map to guide him in his journey.
Clearly, the BACPA is an ambitious piece of legislation with substantial reform
intentions. Unless it was intended to virtually eliminate the relief historically provided in
bankruptcy, additional reform is essential. The current system fails legitimately struggling
debtors and renders the long-standing policy of discharging debt to honest but unfortunate
debtors a mere footnote in history.

THE END
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